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ARGUMENT 
I. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AT THE TWO HEARINGS WAS AN ABUSE 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION 
A. The proffer of attorney's fees at the modification 
hearing was insufficient to carry Defendant's burden of 
proof 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney 
fees at the Modification Hearing because Defendant failed to 
offer any evidence to support the award of fees, and as such, 
Defendant completely failed to carry her burden to show 
reasonableness or necessity of the fees awarded. Utah law 
clearly establishes that the party seeking an award of attorney 
fees has the burden to show the reasonableness and necessity of 
those fees. Delatore v. Del a tore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984). 
In Delatore. the Utah Supreme Court held that statements by 
plaintiff's counsel that he was requesting $1,500.00 in fees were 
insufficient to carry the burden of proof. .Id. In the instant 
case, Defendant's counsel requested fees in the amount of $850.00 
for six and one-fourth hours work. Defendant's counsel did not 
state the necessity of the time spent, the reasonableness of his 
rate, nor the rate commonly charged in the community. There was 
no evidence presented to support the proffer. Defendant's 
counsel did not take the stand, was not sworn, and was not 
subject to cross examination, although Plaintiff's counsel stated 
he would cross examine if he were sworn (Tr. 140). Defendant 
now argues that Plaintiff accepted the proffer, waived any right 
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to cross examination, and failed to enter any evidence of his 
own. This argument, however, fails to recognize that it was not 
Plaintiff's burden to show that the requested fees were 
unreasonable, but it was Defendant's burden to show that the fees 
were reasonable. Delatore, 680 P. 2d at 28. Defendant failed to 
carry her burden. The trial court's award of fees was clearly an 
abuse of discretion and must be stricken. 
B. There is no factual basis to support the award of 
additional fees at the rehearing 
Although not addressed by Appellee in her brief, the award 
of additional fees to Defendant at the oral argument on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing was improper and should be 
stricken. Plaintiff requested a rehearing based upon Plaintiff's 
argument that the findings by the trial court were erroneous, and 
that it was error to award attorney fees at the modification 
hearing due to the lack of evidence presented by Defendant. The 
trial court attempted to rectify the error of the award of fees 
at the prior hearing by forcing evidence at the oral argument. 
Counsel for Defendant testified but presented no evidence as to 
the reasonableness or necessity of fees. In light of the fact 
that Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing was legally and factually 
correct, the award of fees at oral argument was improper and 
should be stricken. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S INCOME AND 
HIS ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A. The trial court's finding that Plaintiff voluntarily 
changed employment is clearly erroneous 
The trial court's determination that Plaintiff voluntarily 
left the employment of USPCI is erroneous because Plaintiff 
testified that USPCI had cut his benefits, began layoffs, and was 
financially unstable (Tr. 47-49, 76-77). Plaintiff was forced 
to change employment when faced with the demise of the company 
for which he worked. The trial court found that Plaintiff 
voluntarily changed employment to his detriment. But this 
finding is erroneous in light of evidence presented by Plaintiff 
that USPCI, his former employer, was downsizing, had phased out 
and eliminated benefits, and was actively seeking a buyer. 
Plaintiff testified that at the time he left the employ of USPCI, 
he no longer had health benefits, four persons just below him in 
seniority had been laid off, and the financial future of the 
company was uncertain (Tr. 47). Plaintiff testified that he no 
longer was paid mileage, but paid on an hourly rate, which 
reduced his income (Tr. 48). Plaintiff testified that based on 
these factors, he obtained new employment which provided benefits 
and better security (Tr. 48-49). Defendant's argument that 
Plaintiff took a pay cut from $54,000.00 per year to $30,000.00 
per year in order to avoid paying an alimony obligation of 
$3,600.00 per year is without merit and flies in the face of 
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common sense• Plaintiff was forced to seek other employment 
because of the demise of the company for which he worked. Based 
on the necessity of changing employers, the trial court's finding 
that Plaintiff voluntarily changed employment, or that he did so 
to avoid paying alimony, is clearly erroneous. 
B. The trial court erred in considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income 
The trial court erred by considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income in determining Plaintiff's annual income. Defendant sets 
forth in her brief that the court made a determination that 
Plaintiff's wife was not a skilled driver and therefore a portion 
of her income must be imputed to Plaintiff. But such is not the 
case. There was no evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff's wife is 
not a skilled driver, nor that she was hired because of 
Plaintiff. Defendant failed to present any evidence on which the 
trial court could make a finding that Plaintiff's wife's income 
should be imputed to Plaintiff. Defendant failed to present any 
case law which supports the trial court's determination to impute 
to Plaintiff a portion of his wife's income. Plaintiff presented 
evidence that April Dobson, Plaintiff's wife, is paid for her 
driving in her own right. The evidence showed that April is paid 
the same mileage rate as Plaintiff, and that she incurs expenses 
on the road just like Plaintiff. Defendant asserted to the trial 
court that April Dobson's income was in fact Plaintiff's second 
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income (Tr. 63), without any evidence to support such an 
assertion. Defendant then urged the trial court to commit error 
by considering April Dobson's income as Plaintiff's income. The 
trial court clearly erred by considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income in the analysis of Plaintiff's ability to pay, 
necessitating remand with instructions as to the propriety of 
considering Plaintiff's wife's income in determining Plaintiff's 
ability to pay. 
C. The trial court erred by considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income but failing to consider her expenses 
The trial court's determination that a portion of 
Plaintiff's wife's income should be considered as Plaintiff's 
income in the determination of Plaintiff's ability to pay without 
considering the added monthly expenses was erroneous. Plaintiff 
presented evidence of his monthly expenses and his income. 
Plaintiff also presented evidence of the monthly expenses of he 
and his wife and their combined income. The trial court 
determined that a portion of Plaintiff's wife's income should be 
considered, but failed to consider the increase in monthly 
expenses. The failure to consider the increase in monthly 
expenses, especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff 
presented evidence that even considering his wife's income, the 
couple does not have the ability to pay alimony, is clearly 
erroneous. 
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D. The trial court/s finding that Plaintiff and his wife 
have annual income of $75.000.00 is clearly erroneous 
Plaintiff and his wife do not earn $75,000.00 per year. 
This finding of fact by the trial court i$ clearly erroneous. 
There is no evidence that Plaintiff has such an income, and in 
fact, all the evidence presented to the trial court supports 
Plaintiff's assertion that he and his wife have annual income of 
approximately $60,000.00. The trial court's error in determining 
that Plaintiff and his wife had income of $75,000.00 coupled with 
the trial court's error in considering Plaintiff's wife's income 
for a determination of Plaintiff's ability to pay requires 
reversal. As set forth in Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff presented 
evidence of monthly income of approximately $2,500.00. 
Plaintiff's wife makes the same monthly income. Plaintiff 
presented evidence that his road expenses, i.e., food and 
incidentals, had increased dramatically. In making its 
determination of annual income, the trial court used a high 
mileage week, multiplied that figure by the mileage pay, and 
extrapolated an annual salary inconsistent with the testimony and 
the facts (Tr. 144-45). Plaintiff had actual income in 1994 of 
approximately $2,500.00 per month. Plaintiff's wife had actual 
income in 1994 of approximately $2,500.00 per month. Together 
they had annual income of approximately $60,000.00. The evidence 
presented to the trial court supports these facts, and it was 
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clearly error for the trial court to make a finding that 
Plaintiff and his wife have annual income of $75,000.00. 
E. The trial court's failure to consider Plaintiff's 
increase in debt incurred to pay alimony was error 
The trial court's failure to consider the increase in 
Plaintiff's debt load was erroneous. Plaintiff presented 
evidence that his debt load had increased from the time of 
divorce in an amount consistent with his alimony obligation. An 
increase in debt can be used to support a modification if the 
debt was incurred in a good faith attempt to meet alimony 
obligations or maintain a decent standard of living. Auerbach v. 
Auerbach. 571 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff presented 
evidence that he had incurred substantial debt in an effort to 
both maintain his standard of living and to pay his alimony 
obligation. Plaintiff's evidence showed a monthly negative cash 
flow of more than $300.00 prior to paying alimony to Defendant. 
The negative cash flow is consistent with the total amount of 
debt incurred by Plaintiff, and it was error for the trial court 
to fail to consider that debt, and the attendant monthly 
payments, to determine whether Plaintiff has suffered a material 
change of circumstances warranting a modification. 
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F, The trial court failed to make adequate findings to 
support its denial of Plaintiff's Petition for Modification 
The trial court erred by failing to make adequate findings 
to support the denial of Plaintiff's Petition to Modify. In 
order to sustain such a finding on appeal, the trial court must 
make findings of fact which demonstrate the obligee's ability to 
pay. These findings must include not only the amount of the 
income, but the expenses of the obligee. Baker v. Baker, 866 
P.2d 540, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Baker. the Court of 
Appeals vacated the alimony award and remanded the case after the 
trial court awarded alimony based only upon Mr. Baker's annual 
income. The Court of Appeals held that it is error to award 
alimony without making specific and adequate findings about the 
paying spouse's expenses. JId. Plaintiff presented evidence at 
the modification hearing that his monthly expenses exceeded his 
monthly income (Tr. 57). The trial court made no findings as to 
Plaintiff's expenses, basing its decision solely on the trial 
court's erroneous determination that Plaintiff and his current 
wife have annual income of $75,000.00 (Tr. 144-45). The failure 
of the trial court to consider Plaintiff's expenses in 
determining his ability to pay alimony is clearly error and the 
trial court's ruling should be vacated and the matter remanded 
for a proper factual determination. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
EMPLOYMENT WAS A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES NOT 
CONTEMPLATED BY THE DECREE 
A. The Findings of Fact and the Decree do not contemplate 
Defendant's employment 
There is no evidence that the parties anticipated that 
Defendant would seek employment and as such, it was clearly error 
for the trial court to make a finding that the parties 
anticipated that Defendant would seek employment. There is no 
provision within the original Findings of Fact and Decree of 
Divorce which recognize that Defendant would seek employment 
(Rec. 76-89). The Findings of Fact clearly set forth that 
alimony is based on Plaintiff's income at that time (Rec. 78). 
It is undisputed that at the time of the stipulation, Defendant 
was unemployed. It is also undisputed that at the time of the 
entry of the Decree, some months later, Defendant had obtained 
part-time employment, but had failed to inform Plaintiff or the 
court. If there is no provision in the Decree itself regarding 
future employment, such employment cannot be anticipated by the 
Decree. Durf ee v. Durf ee . 796 P. 2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In Durf ee, the Court of Appeals held that even if the 
parties discuss future employment, it is not anticipated by the 
Decree if it is not contained in the Decree. Id. Defendant 
argues that her employment was anticipated by the decree, yet the 
Decree and the Findings of Fact are completely devoid of any 
reference to Defendant's income. Plaintiff testified that at the 
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time of the divorce, it was his understanding that Defendant 
would not work because she was in ill health which prevented her 
from working (Tr. 72-73). Defendant testified that at the time 
of the stipulation, she was unemployed (Tr. 14-15). Defendant 
testified on cross-examination that at the time the stipulation 
was reached, it was in her mind that she would have to seek 
employment (Tr. 29). Defendant failed to offer any evidence 
that the parties contemplated that Defendant would seek 
employment, other than what was in Defendant's mind at the time. 
The lack of an express provision in the Decree, and the lack of 
any evidence that the parties actually anticipated the employment 
make the increase in Defendant's income an increase not 
contemplated in the decree.JDurfee, 796 P.2d at 716. Absent any 
recognition of Defendant's future income, her increase in 
earnings is necessarily a material change of circumstances not 
contemplated within the Decree, and it was error for the trial 
court to find that her increase in income was contemplated within 
the Decree. 
B. Plaintiff demonstrated that Defendant's increase in 
income is a material change because her income is sufficient 
to meet her needs 
Plaintiff presented evidence in the form of Defendant's 
testimony that Defendant's income is sufficient to meet her 
needs, and as such, Defendant is no longer in need of alimony. 
At the time of the Decree, Defendant did not have income to meet 
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her needs (Rec. 10-11). At the Modification hearing, the trial 
court determined that Defendant has monthly income of $865.00 
from her employment (Tr. 143). Defendant testified that her 
actual monthly expenses are $545.52 (Tr. 126). Based on her 
ratio of income to expenses, Defendant is amply able to provide 
for her needs. The trial court failed to make a determination as 
to Defendant's ability to provide for her needs in the analysis 
of whether or not a modification is warranted. The Court of 
Appeals set forth that a trial court must make a finding as to 
each of the elements of an alimony award in order to survive 
scrutiny. Baker, 866 P.2d at 546. In Baker. the Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court on the award of alimony stating that the 
trial court must make adequate findings on all material issues, 
and the trial court's failure to make findings regarding Mrs. 
Baker's needs and expenses required remand. Id. In the instant 
case, the trial court failed to make any findings about 
Defendant's ability to meet her needs which is a material prong 
of the alimony analysis. The trial court's failure to make 
adequate findings regarding Defendant's ability to meet her needs 
is erroneous and requires remand. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney 
fees to Defendant at the Modification hearing because Defendant 
completely failed to carry her burden to show reasonableness and 
necessity. The burden of proof to show the propriety of the 
fees, and whether or not she is entitled to an award of fees, 
rests upon the party seeking an award of fees. Defendant failed 
to carry her burden. Defendant's argument that Plaintiff failed 
to present evidence that the fees requested were unreasonable is 
erroneous because Plaintiff does not have the burden of proof. 
Defendant failed to present evidence to support an award of fees. 
The trial court's award of fees was an abuse of discretion and 
the award must be stricken. 
The trial court's award of further fees at oral argument on 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing was an abuse of discretion 
because Plaintiff's Petition was legally and factually correct. 
The award was an abuse of discretion because Defendant again 
failed to carry her burden to prove that the fees requested were 
reasonable and necessary. The trial court's award of additional 
fees to Defendant was an abuse of discretion and must be 
stricken. 
The trial court erred by finding that Plaintiff had 
voluntarily changed employment when the evidence presented to the 
court showed that Plaintiff was forced to change employment to 
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avoid being laid off. Plaintiff testified that his former 
employer had reduced his wages, cut or eliminated his benefits, 
and ^as actively laying off drivers. The trial court failed to 
consider the evidence and erroneously made a finding that 
Plaintiff voluntarily changed his employment. 
The trial court erred by considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income in its determination of Plaintiff's ability to pay 
alimony. There was no evidence before the trial court which 
would support consideration of Plaintiff's wife's income. 
Defendant wholly failed to demonstrate the propriety of such a 
consideration. The trial court's inclusion of Plaintiff's wife's 
income was clearly error and must be remanded with instructions. 
The trial court erred by considering Plaintiff's wife's 
income but failing to consider her expenses. Plaintiff presented 
evidence that even with his wife's income, their monthly expenses 
exceeded their income. The trial court clearly erred by failing 
to consider the added expenses of both Plaintiff and his wife in 
the determination of Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. 
The trial court's determination that Plaintiff and his wife 
have annual income of $75,000.00 is clearly erroneous and 
requires remand. Plaintiff presented evidence that his monthly 
income is approximately $2,500.00. The evidence showed that 
Plaintiff's wife had approximately the same monthly income. 
There was no evidence before the trial court upon which a 
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determination of annual income of $75,000.00 could be based. As 
such, the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous and requires 
remand. 
The trial court clearly erred by failing to consider 
Plaintiff's monthly expenses and his additional debt in the 
determination of his ability to pay alimony. The trial court 
committed further error by failing to make adequate findings to 
support its denial of Plaintiff's Petition. The trial court 
failed to make a finding as to Plaintiff's expenses, contrary to 
established Utah law. The trial court's failure to make a 
finding as to Plaintiff's expenses cannot withstand scrutiny and 
requires remand. 
Finally, the trial court committed reversible error by 
failing to consider Defendant's employment and income in the 
determination of whether to modify the alimony award. The trial 
court erred by finding that Defendant's employment was 
contemplated by the Decree because no such language exists in the 
Decree. The Findings of Fact consider only Plaintiff's income. 
The trial court committed further error by failing to determine 
that Defendant's income adequately meets her needs and expenses. 
Defendant's employment is a material change not contemplated by 
the Decree. As such, the trial court was obliged to make a 
determination as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to a 
modification. The trial court failed to make such a 
14 
determination and its failure to so do requires remand with 
instructions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2? day of November, 1995. 
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